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Introduction: Public protection networks and criminality information practices

1.1 Criminality information practices involve public authorities in the UK (and elsewhere) gathering, retaining and sharing information that connects with an identifiable individual; all with the ostensible aim of upholding and improving standards of public protection. This piece first charts the landscape of contemporary criminality information practices in the UK today.

1.2 Jamie Grace has recently noted that: “Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance uses the idea of sharing ‘public protection information’ to represent a professional and institutional ethos concerning public protection for policing authorities.”​[1]​ 

1.3 The term ‘criminality information’ is preferred by Sir Ian Magee in his review of criminality information practices in public protection networks​[2]​. This piece uses the term ‘criminality information’ not necessarily out of a sense of solidarity with the Magee Review​[3]​, but because in the socio-legal analysis that follows later in this piece attention is drawn to the structures and practices of public protection networks and the way that they balance potential stigmatisation of individuals with the duty to manage risk posed by those who are perceived to be criminal – and so the (alleged) criminality inherent in this informational context is the emphasis appropriate for clarity here.

1.4 But we can assume that the term criminality information relates to ‘sensitive personal data’, as per S.1 of the Data Protection Act 1998, used and processed by the criminal justice system. This would ensure a typology of criminality information would include categories such as allegations​[4]​, records of arrest and/or charge and/or prosecution, statements by witnesses and (alleged) offenders themselves, cautions, convictions, records of penalty notices for disorder, sentencing reports, tax and/or benefit investigations, and surveillance intelligence – as well as ‘peripheral’ ‘intelligence’ such as ASBOs and reports of anti-social behaviour itself (despite the non-criminal nature of this behaviour by its very definition). By no means is this list an exhaustive definition, but hopefully it will serve as a working typology for criminality information as discussed in this piece.


2. Discussion: Recent legal emphases and policy directions for public protection networks

2.1 Criminality information practices are something that can be largely said to be standardised across the UK from a policy perspective, but highly complex and nuanced from a legal perspective. The political landscape of the issue of public protection information sharing is relatively simple, for example: public protection is an absolute priority for organisations in the public sector amongst the criminal justice, welfare, health, housing and (therefore) voluntary sectors. In policy terms, issues of potential stigmatisation of those (perhaps in some cases unfairly) perceived as risky individuals is a lesser concern or priority. As a result, ACPO guidance, for instance, has a template information sharing agreement for police use with different kinds of public authorities​[5]​. 

2.2 As a result of overlapping policy concerns relating to public protection, and legal duties and powers in relation to criminality information practices, decision-making amongst public protection networks is complex, and as Brett Scharffs might have it, is built from elements of phronesis (‘practical wisdom’), techne (‘craft’) and rhetorica (‘rhetoric’)​[6]​.

2.3 The legalities of public protection information sharing are then much more complex than can be reproduced in an ACPO guidance document that could be drawn on meaningfully by public protection networks. Criminality information sharing between public bodies, occurring as one aspect of public protection practice, must be done on some lawful basis. This can be either through (express or implied) statutory authority or through reliance on common law powers. 

2.4 In terms of statutory channels of criminality information sharing, Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates relied on by employers for vetting and ‘safeguarding’ purposes, for example, are created under provisions of the Police Act 1997​[7]​. Local authorities and police organisations can share information about anti-social behaviour under S.115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Health organisations in the NHS can share public protection information with police organisations under relevant provisions of the Health and Social Care Act 2012​[8]​. The parent or carer’s ‘right to ask’ about risks posed by individuals to children with whom they come into contact is embodied in S.327A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Data Protection Act 1998 contains certain exemptions from the typical data protection framework for information sharing, or ‘processing’, in relation to ‘crime and taxation’ matters – and these exemptions can be interpreted as an implied statutory authority that would underpin all criminality information sharing in the pursuit of public protection.

2.5 As noted above, the police also have common law powers of criminality information sharing to underpin that aspect of their criminality information practices in their public protection role​[9]​. But these are suffused with human rights values stemming from, principally, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’). Because of the construction of Article 8, and the influence of jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (‘the ECtHR’), challenges in the courts through judicial review to particular instances of criminality information sharing in the aim of public protection will inevitably turn on the thorny notion of proportionality​[10]​, as there is often a legitimate basis for the information sharing concerned ‘described in law’ (given the multitude of channels and avenues for it, as outlined above) and since public protection practices are an example of a necessary approach to addressing a ‘pressing social need’ i.e. public protection itself​[11]​.
 
2.6 In terms of rights to consultation and/or notification for offenders, we’ve come a long way from the conclusion of the court in R (Wareham) v Purbeck Borough Council [2005] EWHC 358 that there was no requirement to consult an individual as a potential recipient of an ASBO under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, despite the argument that Articles 6 (the right to a fair hearing) and 8 (the right to respect for private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) necessitated such a requirement.

2.7 Cases such as X v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2012] EWHC 2954 and H & L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403 see the courts stipulate that there is indeed a ‘procedural component’ to decision-making that can require consultation on the part of a criminal justice agency with an offender or alleged offender, with regard to what information should be shared about them for public protection purposes, how it might b shared, and with whom, etc. This is to ensure that the sharing of information with the aim of public protection is undertaken on a proportionate basis (see R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3).

2.8 This is now a concept which deserves respect from criminal justice agencies in business of sharing ‘intelligence’ in the process of enhancing public protection, even in the highest-priority arenas, such as the prevention of sexual and serious violent offences, including the abuse of vulnerable people and children (see R (A) v Chief Constable of Kent Constabulary [2013] EWHC 424 (Admin)). However, an important exception is that some instances require the rapid sharing of information to protect the public, and so consultation should take place where practicable (see R (B) v The Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2011] EWHC 2362 (Admin)).

2.9 Things have also begun to shift in recent years and months with respect to the manner in which the courts treat the issue of the retention of ‘criminality information’ or ‘police intelligence’ – beginning with the adoption of a stance that now requires the eventual deletion of DNA and fingerprint profiles belonging to individuals without convictions from national databases (see R (GC & C) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21 and provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012). The other areas of change have come from cases addressing the retention of criminality information such as allegations, statements, cautions, convictions and surveillance intelligence – which was all deemed in 2009 to be retained lawfully on an indefinite basis (see Chief Constable of Humberside Police v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 1079).

2.10 But more recent decisions in the courts, the judiciary are shifting their stance on what constitutes the proper retention of criminality information, and thus there has been of late a fresh consideration of what criminality and criminality information, at least, could be said to be (see R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2010] 1 WLR 123). In the recent decision of R (Catt and T) v ACPO & Metropolitan Police [2013] EWCA Civ 192 Moore-Bick LJ has noted that (para. 7):

“Even information of a public nature, such as a conviction, may become private over the course of time as memories fade, thereby enabling people to put their past behind them… and the storage and use of personal information that has been gathered from open sources (e.g. public observation, media reports etc.) may involve an infringement of a person’s rights under article 8(1) if it amounts to an unjustified interference with his personal privacy.”

2.11 Moore-Brick LJ’s view is supported by the recent decision in R (Thomas and JB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 25 which has determined that consideration of the notion of individual rehabilitation must be given in interpreting a statutory framework on the sharing of spent convictions and data relating to less serious offences. 

2.12 However, we will not now receive a view from the UK Supreme Court in the Thomas case on the extent to which this ethos of de-stigmatisation must be encapsulated in the law, since the Home Office and the Disclosure and Barring Service have set out proposals​[12]​ on the potential reform of the ‘filtering’ system to be introduced to ensure that the process of creating an Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate under provisions in the Police Act 1997 as amended is compliant with the requirements of Article 8 ECHR and with Strasbourg jurisprudence​[13]​.

2.13 Even if these legislative proposals do not come to fruition, the idea of the importance of one’s past actions growing dimmer over time is challenged by the operationally-focused exception to this principle – namely, that if an individual is thought to demonstrate ‘criminality’ or risk of criminality in their current behaviour under investigation, this notion of gradually-receding necessity to retain the criminality information concerned no longer applies (see Kinloch v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 62.)

2.14 What is clear however is that whether an individual is always known as a peaceful protestor, or historically an ‘innocent’ person in some other arena, they will be able to benefit from the rationale in Catt and T. The key issue then has become: What is a current or recent risk or demonstration of criminality, for investigatory purposes? If we could determine this, we might have a useful definition of criminality information. However this is beyond the scope of this paper, we must consolidate at least an overview of privacy values and stigmatisation in the field of criminality information practices.

3. Privacy rights and values

3.1 When this author speaks of ‘privacy’ it is with reference to a flexible and broad workable definition of personal or individual privacy concerned with practical autonomy: for example, that of Kendall Thomas, who outlined a tripartite notion of decisional privacy​[14]​, bodily privacy and spatial privacy​[15]​. This author would add to these elements a notion of ‘informational privacy’ to reflect concerns about the exercise of power though e-governance in drawing on personal information that describes the most intimate details of the lives of UK citizens. Professor Graeme Laurie identified the concept of ‘informational privacy’ in his own research. Laurie prefers ‘informational privacy’ as a certain term of art; he says: “… privacy can be seen as a state in which personal information about an individual is in a state of non-access from others – informational privacy.”​[16]​ This author would of course readily add ‘non-sharing to others’ within Laurie’s definition of informational privacy.

3.2 Helen Nissenbaum has argued that privacy rights must vary within dissimilar contexts, and that breaches of privacy rights are likely to occur where the context for those privacy rights has not been addressed relative to other contexts​[17]​. ‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity’ is the regulatory model for privacy rights and infringements recommended by Nissenbaum​[18]​, and it essentially supports the idea that information sharing in particular, specific contexts deserve specific principles to regulate and proscribes valid personal information sharing for that particular, specific context. This allows us to consider the principle of personal information sharing across and without the criminal justice system in the UK in near-isolation in this piece.

3.3 By ‘privacy rights’ we should mean the defensible privacy interests that exist in keeping the individual persona free from inappropriate stigma that might other wise damage the relationships one person may have with others in relation to their working, social or family life. This is the argument for privacy rights that De Bruin has acknowledged as the privacy argument from relationships​[19]​ which is considered in more detail later in this piece.

3.4 The idea of privacy is ephemeral for manner academic commentators – and the notion of the public interest can sometimes be equally difficult for judges and public protection professionals, in all their guises, to work with, but only because the latter is so clunking and cumbersome. As Mark Taylor has noted, “similarly to privacy, the ‘public interest’ is a notoriously uncertain idea”​[20]​.

3.5 Mark Taylor has argued that “…there is a public interest in the proper protection of privacy… this public interest cannot be served by the idea of personal data”​[21]​. What Taylor is suggesting is that concepts of privacy must accommodate those occasions when personal information of some kind should be drawn upon by society in a regulated activity for some broadly beneficent purpose – i.e. sometimes, the state will have to ‘own you’. Taylor is discussing research conducted using genetic data of individuals, but this idea transfers equally well to the public protection sphere.

3.6 Taylor helps us address the principle problems of defining, let alone ‘applying’, concepts of both ‘privacy’ and the ‘public interest’. Taylor has written that:

“Capturing an accurate description of privacy seems at times rather like netting fog. Not only is it amongst a class of things, like time or electricity, that is more easily experienced (and lost) that explained; it also extends in many different directions simultaneously.”​[22]​

3.7 On the definitional problems inherent within public interest debates, Taylor notes:

“There are many different ideas of what it is reasonable for ‘the system’ to strive to achieve. In fact, one might note that the concept of public interest is susceptible to just as much variation as the normative bases of privacy… Proper privacy protection is not just simply consistent with the public interest, it is crucial to it.”​[23]​

3.8 If we are to have the correct regulation of intrusions into privacy because of public protection concerns through legislation, it is best then that this legislation does not draw upon terms or values of privacy directly, nor invoke the ‘public interest’ in any limb of a ‘test’ concerned with the proper circumstances for the sharing of criminality information for the purposes of public protection.

4. A suggested framework for correct legal regulation of criminality information practices

4.1 Mark Taylor notes that Lon Fuller suggests “the legal enterprise of subjecting human conduct in the governance of rules depended upon those rules being general, promulgated, clear, free from contradiction, relatively constant, not requiring the impossible, and administered in practice in accordance with the law in the books”​[24]​. 

4.2 Taylor coalesces Fuller’s views into the notion that “[s]uccessful regulation requires a degree of clarity, generality, consistency and relative constancy”​[25]​.

4.3 Let us address these constituent parts of correct regulation, as Taylor has them, in brief detail, and in relation to the legalities of criminality information sharing:

As to Clarity – is the regulatory framework effective because it is clear enough?

4.4 The legal framework relating to criminality information practices is highly complex and so is somewhat unclear in that sense of clarity as a lack of complexity – however, with a enough information about the circumstances faced by the public protection network ‘actors’ concerned in following their public protection aims, we would see that the complexity of a scenario involving criminality information sharing, for example, is simply a matter of an accurate typology of that practice and the correct corresponding legal powers being drawn upon. For example, this would mean the police not using powers under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to share information relating to allegations of serious sexual offending since those powers only relate to the sharing of information relating to anti-social behaviour only, not much more serious offences relating to out-and-out criminality​[26]​.

4.5 Some features of the whole typology of criminality information sharing as a public protection practice by networks of public authorities are less well-grounded or articulated in the law e.g. the piloted Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme, a very important policy move from a public protection perspective, is not underpinned by statute, while its child protection counterpart, the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (which was never just used to disclose ‘intelligence’ in relation to only child sex offences in any event) has a statutory basis in the Criminal Justice Act 2003​[27]​, as noted above.

As to Generality – is the regulatory framework effective because it is broad enough to address all relevant scenarios?

4.6 Certainly it can be stated that there are no lacunae in the legal powers to share criminality information, due to the presence of an implied statutory power stemming from S.29 of the Data Protection Act 1998 to share criminality information (as “sensitive personal data”) for public protection purposes, as well as the breadth of the common law power to carry out this public protection practice. The complexity that this article addresses in part is not one of lacunae that need to be addressed, but that such overlapping between “public protection law” and “privacy law” as occurs in criminality information sharing and public protection decision-making then results in great complexity.

As to Consistency and Relative Constancy – Namely, is the regulatory framework effective because different factual scenarios are treated with the same decision-making process? And is the regulatory framework effective because when similar factual scenarios are addressed, similar outcomes are reached by decision-makers?

4.7 The body of empirical research on public protection decision-making and criminality information sharing would suggest there is a lack of both consistency and relative constancy in criminality information practices with regard to the work and decision-making across public protection networks.

4.8 Institutions, according to Bellamy et al, fall into one of four categories:

	hierarchy institutions (subject to strong regulation and featuring strong integration [with other institutions]);
	individualism institutions (subject to weak regulation and featuring weak integration [with other institutions]);
	enclave institutions (subject to weak regulation and featuring strong integration [with other institutions); and
	isolate institutions (subject to strong regulation and featuring weak integration [with other institutions])​[28]​

4.9	Strong or weak integration here might mean more, or less, thorough sharing of information for public protection purposes across public protection networks. Bellamy et al have conducted hundreds of interviews in their study referred to here; data from these interviews bear out this particular typology of organisations as actors in public protection networks. While Bellamy et al have categorised in their empirical the sorts of organisations that are engaged in criminality information sharing by their institutional characteristics as ‘enclave’ or ‘hierarchical’ bodies, etc, Richardson and Asthana note​[29]​ the following four potential qualities of the information-sharing organisation in relation to the information sharing culture in the organisation itself, and as typically one of: ‘Ideal’, ‘Over-open’, ‘Over-cautious’, or ‘Chaotic’.

4.10 Hall and Slembrouck have argued that criminality information sharing professionals behave in accordance with the ‘role expectations’ they have of other professionals and themselves when it comes to styles of information sharing​[30]​.

4.11 In addition to this, Hall and Slembrouck have noted that criminality information sharing professionals pass not just isolate facts but entire narratives in accordance with their role expectations, comprising of raw data placed into contexts of judgement, so that criminality information does not arrive in the hands of a decision-maker free of prejudicing meta-data: an individual under scrutiny, and about whom criminality information is to be shared, could be said to be the parent of a child who is missing, or rather, the parent of a child who is thought to have been abducted and hidden by that same parent, to give one of the examples that Hall and Slembrouck use themselves to make this point​[31]​. 

4.12 Bellamy et al have found that there is a lack of institutional transparency and accountability in the manner of information sharing within and across the public authorities that comprise the criminal justice, health and social care systems​[32]​. There are a number of passages from their groundbreaking study, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK, worth reproducing at some length and commenting upon, since this study is the most comprehensive empirical study in the area. With regard to the differences in criminality information practices across public protection networks, Bellamy et al found that:

“The implication is that there are still many cases where information is not being shared where it should be, with the consequence that the government’s social policies are not being consistently implemented, the full extent of some clients’ problems are being insufficiently recognized, appropriate interventions are not being made, and clients, their families and sometimes the wider public are being put at risk of preventable harm. At worst, we can expect further tragedies... In addition, the patchiness of local information-sharing practices means that there is a high probability that some personal information is being shared in circumstances that may not warrant it, with costs both to personal privacy and to service outcomes. [There is] the possibility that the apparent willingness to attach blame to frontline staff and agencies when cases go wrong may be combining with stronger policy imperatives to encourage inappropriate information-sharing, with the risk that client confidentiality is violated unnecessarily, the trust of clients in public services may be undermined, clients are needlessly stigmatized as posing risks or problems, and unacceptable or unjust outcomes may be triggered.”​[33]​

4.13 So Bellamy et al have found that information sharing is sometimes undertaken in a way that is not compliant with government policy – and impliedly in an unlawful way where information sharing takes place in a way that transgresses codes of practice, published polices and the wider legal framework as relevant.

4.14 Bellamy et al note that some informal, non-statutory or ‘organic’ information sharing is prima facie unlawful, and that some is ‘organic’ but lawful:

“Interviews conducted for this study revealed that, in a few cases, informal workarounds lead to law-breaking, mainly by contravening data protection legislation. But informal practices are more typically used to address the gaps, to deal with the inconsistencies and to reduce the bureaucratic transaction costs commonly associated with all forms of formal regulation…”​[34]​

4.15 This does not account however for the public lawyers’ concern that due process must be complied with to produce lawful and compliant decisions, as required by the common law and the Human Rights Act 1998, and as discussed elsewhere in this piece, and by David Mead​[35]​.

4.16 Bellamy et al have found that with regard to the problems of varying risk, policy pressure, levels of emergency, bureaucratic demands and so on, which might be solved by non-statutory information sharing:

 “All these problems mean that managers and their staff cannot operate on the basis of unambiguous national guidance, laws and codes. Still less do they operate within uncontested local interpretations of their underlying ethics and rationale. If frontline information-sharing depends on judgement as much as rules – and therefore as much on tacit understandings as on formal protocols – then in very few of the [multi-agency arrangements or MAAs] in our study is there an uncontested basis for building the kind of shared understandings that would support the consistent and confident application of judgement. As a result, the tasks of establishing agreement across the MAA about what counts as appropriate information sharing, let alone of enforcing it, are far from simple.”​[36]​

4.17 Bellamy et al have found that there are a variety of approaches taken by the variety of institutions faced with this dual concern of operational effectiveness versus legality:

“Some – mainly hierarchical or enclaved – agencies attempted to address such problems by providing frontline workers with stronger internal social regulation through regular supervisions or more formal training in information-sharing practices. More frequently, workers relied on tacit guidance provided by their own professional training or long occupational experience. This could work well in hierarchical and individualistic settings where workers could be confident of a high degree of compatibility between their own expectations and those of the agency and where they, consequently, were able accurately to gauge the limits of the agency’s tolerance of informal practices.”​[37]​

4.18 The authors then identify two crucial issues that arise as a result of this of “individual goal-seeking behaviour enabled by individualistic forms and on the coping mechanisms encouraged by isolate forms”:

“First, this state of affairs undermines an important precept of justice, namely that like cases should be treated alike. The reliance, to a greater or lesser extent in all MAAs in this study, on pragmatic and particular solutions encouraged by isolate and individualistic forms means that similar cases are almost certainly being treated differently in different MAAs, and probably in the same MAAs at different times. Second, the reliance on informal practices associated with these forms certainly undermines the ability of MAAs, and their member organizations, to assure justice, let alone conformity to law, because it necessarily masks the extent of differences and their outcomes. Despite the assertion of much stronger national prescription, information-sharing practices in British social policy continue, at best, to be lacking in transparency, are inconsistent and unpredictable and, in some cases, may therefore be unjust. At worst, they pose real and present risks of devastating consequences to vulnerable people, or to the potential victims of dangerous ones, while at the same time failing to assure the consistent application of confidentiality norms and privacy principles.”​[38]​

4.19 The one disagreement we should today have here with Bellamy et al is that there is or has been an ‘assertion of much stronger national prescription’ in relation to information-sharing practices, at least with regard to clarity. The regular work of the courts in judicial review cases in the last three years, in dealing with these issues, suggests otherwise​[39]​. We are perhaps only just now arriving at a consolidatory point given recent decisions of the courts, statutory reforms and Home Office proposals, as noted above etc.

4.20 There is in fact a web of interlinking legal principles which provide the legal landscape for those information-sharing practices, particularly in the field of criminality information-sharing. I would however readily agree that there is a prevailing lack of transparency, consistency and predictability, particularly given the mass of evidence Bellamy et al have established in their work.

4.21 In conclusion then Bellamy et al postulate that importantly:

“Where the volume of information-sharing is increasing, this may be as much the result of instrumental, individualistic and coping behaviours as of an increase in formal regulation. This, then, is the fundamental policy problem facing national policy-makers in seeking to resolve the apparent dilemma between information sharing and privacy, such that a systematic shift towards more and better information-sharing is achieved.”​[40]​

5. Institutional isomorphism in relation to criminality information practices

5.1 In moving on to consider institutional isomorphism in relation to criminality information practices, Simon Halliday notes that “socio-legal scholars writing within a tradition of institutionalist sociology focus on the significance of networks for organisational responses to law”:

“Institutionalist sociology of organisations has explored how organisations within the same field become more alike in their structures and operations—what DiMaggio and Powell describe as processes of “isomorphism”. DiMaggio and Powell posit that there are three mechanisms of isomorphic change: coercive, normative and mimetic. Coercive isomorphism occurs when organisations are put under pressure from other organisations on which they are dependent. In our analysis, we would associate this with hierarchical pressures. However, mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations copy other organisations, often because of uncertain conditions. Further, normative isomorphism occurs when organisations adopt and apply norms that are shared in wider cultural forums, particularly professional associations.​[41]​”

5.2 Di Maggio and Powell, as well as Halliday, are thus identifying the underpinning institutional isomorphic behaviours that Bellamy et al have established occur across public protection networks comprised of public authorities staffed by public protection professionals etc. In terms of criminality information practices across those public protection networks as adopted recently, coercive isomorphism has occurred when the police have reacted to Home Office, ACPO or NPIA guidance in a strictly hierarchical manner​[42]​. The courts reacting to pressure from the ECtHR to adopt certain values and approaches in interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR, because of the mechanism found in S.2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that links domestic jurisprudence to ECtHR jurisprudence on issues invoking the margin of appreciation, could also be said to be coercive institutional isomorphism, disguised as intrajuridical dialogue. Mimetic isomorphism has occurred in a growing culture of public protection professionalism as ‘role characteristics’ and criminality information best practices, in some organisations, as Hall and Slembrouck seem to suggest​[43]​. In terms of normative isomorphism, we can now explore the issue of individuals (such as lawyers, judges, police officers and local authority professionals) and organisations making up public protection networks acting as stigma/protection oriented ‘performance teams’ that adopt particular cultural norms, within the socio-legal framework created by an analysis of the work of De Bruin, Moreham, Black and Goffman, amongst others.

6. Public protection networks as ‘performance teams’ of actors

6.1 One irrefutable factor in an argument for legal recognition of personal privacy rights is that which De Bruin calls the ‘argument from relationships’ – the observable notion that the sharing of information across boundaries of information possession changes the views and opinions, and hence the resulting actions and decisions, that individuals (and society or institutions) form and share about other individuals​[44]​. Empirically, Moreham’s survey of article 8 ECHR cases that define the notion of a private and family as seen by the European Court of Human Rights shows us that privacy rights derived from personal relationships are many-faceted​[45]​.
6.2 In accepting this finding by Moreham, an individual’s ‘informational privacy’ would be infringed, following De Bruin’s outline of the ‘argument from relationships’, when the sharing of personal information impacts negatively upon autonomy in a way that is disproportionate. De Bruin highlights the notion of decision-making processes that rely upon the sharing of personal information as indicative of a kind of ‘informational privacy’ that is dependent upon privacy values expressed as ‘negative freedom’ i.e. freedom from intrusion to autonomy in some way.
6.3 De Bruin writes: 
“…the connection between privacy and negative freedom has a three-step structure. The first step is the very disclosure of information. A sender, A, discloses information about a subject, B, to a recipient, C. (Note that A and B may be identical.) Disclosure is used in a general sense here, as it may involve not only speaking and writing but also drawing C's attention to a certain scene involving B that is happening right now…The second step covers belief revision. On the basis of the information obtained from A, agent C revises her earlier beliefs about B… Finally, the third step involves action. The new beliefs may motivate C to perform a certain action she would not have performed if A had not given her the information concerning B; and if performing this action constitutes interference with B, then B's negative freedom has been reduced as a result of an invasion of privacy.” [Emphasis added.]​[46]​ 
6.4 Public protection practices of criminality information sharing, it is argued, are underpinned by De Bruin’s concept of ‘belief revision’, following ‘disclosure’ and followed by specific actions to reduce the perceived or actual risk posed to members of the public.
6.5 This disclosure of risk, or criminality information indicating a potential of risk, may well itself occur because the public protection network or public protection professional concerned might well be risk averse, having adopted this view through mimetic or normative isomorphic processes. Julia Black has observed that: 

“…in setting out what are considered to be acceptable and unacceptable risks, risk-based regulation implicitly or explicitly defines what risks the regulator should be expected to prevent, and those which it should not. In so doing, it in effect attempts to define the parameters of blame: of what risks an agency should prevent, and be blamed for not preventing, and those which it should not seek to prevent, or at least not seek so actively to prevent, and thus by implication those for which it should not be blamed for not preventing… Risk-based regulation introduces a new politics of accountability which goes to the heart of the accountability debate, not so much in terms of the mechanisms of accountability, which is the usual focus, but in terms of just what it is that regulators should be accountable for.”​[47]​

6.6 That politics of accountability is what Erving Goffman would have termed a matter of ‘frontstage’ reciprocity. Goffman outlined an analogical framework of the ‘dramaturgical routine’ to help explain the behaviours of ‘performance teams’ engaged in mutual activity, as public protection networks or actors and agencies are engaged in with regard to criminality information practices. Goffman noted that because of ‘reciprocal dependence’ (they need each other) and ‘reciprocal familiarity’ (they trust each other) then ‘performance teams’ (here public protection networks) will ‘maintain the line’ against an audience of those on the ‘outside’. Those regions which are not ‘frontstage’ or ‘backstage’ are ‘the outside’, and are populated with ‘outsiders’ – which Goffman conceived of as potential audience members. 

6.7 So most members of the public are ‘outsiders’ – that is, an audience to the work of public protection professionals​[48]​. But the audience of outsiders with regard to the performance of public protection must be satisfied, and must maintain their confidence in public protection networks as performance teams, or rather, have their confidence maintained by the public protection networks themselves​[49]​. This could be argued to be just as much a feature of ‘directive dominance’ with regard to public protection, that is, for Goffman, the true set of motivations behind a performance, as the protection of the public themselves​[50]​.

6.8 Members of the public who are part of the dramaturgical routine of public protection decision-making across organisational networks include those people who are deemed to pose a risk to others in society. Individuals seeking to avoid stigmatisation, that is, De Bruin’s ‘belief revision’, by others about them and their perceived level of risk, will act upon opportunities to minimise the possibility and scope of that belief revision, or stigmatisation​[51]​. 

6.9 For Goffman, an individual person is actually a ‘multiplicity of selves’, and that person will attempt to limit the exposure of any stigmatising characteristics about their nature or their history to the world at large​[52]​. An individual thought to be ‘risky’ in public protection terms might well see their own criminality information, possessed by public protection networks, as what Goffman would call ‘dark secrets’: 

“These consist of facts about a [person or group] which it knows and conceals and which are incompatible with the image of self that the team attempts to maintain before its audience… Dark secrets are, of course, double secrets: one is the crucial fact that is hidden and another is the fact that crucial facts have not been openly admitted.”​[53]​

6.10 Public protection professionals might be keen to keep these items of criminality information as ‘free secrets’, since as Goffman wrote, a “free secret is somebody else’s secret known to oneself that one could disclose without discrediting the image one was presenting of oneself.​[54]​”

6.11 Any analysis of the individual effort to reduce stigma can be undertaken as analysis using Goffman’s dramaturgical framework with regard to the management of stigma. There are in the common law and plainly apparent numerous cases involving claimants with stigma engaged in litigation as an activity or behaviour to constitute ‘passing’ (as the concealment of stigmatising characteristics), ‘covering’ (as limiting the impact of obtrusive stigmatising characteristics) or ‘adjusting’ (as accepting the effects of their stigmatising characteristics)​[55]​.

6.12 Goffman would label organisations like the police as ‘protective agents’ within a performance team (for Magee, a ‘public protection network’). ‘Spotters’ for those protective agents would then constitute intervening and assisting organisations, such as local authorities and parts of the NHS etc. Trying to broaden out the array of ‘spotters’ to include members of the public, if only to give them as much confidence in the public protection ‘routine’ as possible, is doctrinally difficult. In R (Ellis) v The Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321 (Admin), the police in Essex wanted to begin a local naming and shaming scheme, which the High Court was minded  to tolerate in the absence of statutory guidance to the contrary. In the case of juveniles, however, ‘naming and shaming’ is very much more difficult, with greater regard being had to the art. 8 ECHR rights of convicted juveniles, despite the corresponding right to freedom of expression enjoyed by journalists etc. as ‘spotters’ courtesy of art. 10 ECHR and their corresponding qualified right to freedom of expression. In R (Y) v Aylesbury Crown Court & Others [2012] EWHC 1140 (Admin) for instance, the High Court quashed the decision to publish the name and address of a 16 year old convicted of arson in the interests of his wellbeing, while in ZY, Paul Higgins v Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service [2013] NIQB 8 the privacy interests of a convicted child sex offender had to be protected through ongoing anonymity, in order to safeguard his wellbeing from risk of suicide as a result in ostracisation or harassment by his own community, when it appeared a journalist was to publish a piece featuring him in connection with his locality in that community.





7.1 Three conclusions are offered up for consideration: firstly, that the growing complexity of the law and regulation relating to criminality information practices might improve privacy values in the criminal justice system and help to add precision to necessary processes of stigmatisation in relation to the aim of public protection. 

7.2 Secondly, that these shifts in the law still need ongoing revisions, in order that an appropriately hierarchical approach to criminality information practices can be arrived at over time, since this would balance organisational duties of public protection and individual privacy interests. 
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